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Panel: Negotiating Strategies for University Administrators 
 
An Alternative Strategy: Interest-Based Bargaining 
 
 
William I. Shorrock 
Professor Emeritus of History 
Cleveland State University 
 
 
 
My three colleagues on the panel have talked with you about several important aspects of 
traditional, adversarial collective bargaining.  The general characteristics of traditional 
bargaining are familiar.  Each side develops its positions and then defends them tenaciously 
while opposing the other side’s pre-established positions.  The process works in that agreements 
are finally reached, although the confrontational aspect can be dispiriting and embittering.  Mark 
Twain once observed: “If the only tool you have is a hammer, then every problem will look like 
a nail.”  I would like to suggest that Interest-Based Bargaining (sometimes called “Win-Win 
Bargaining” or  “Mutual Gains Bargaining” provides a wholly new set of tools for the process of 
solving problems or negotiating union contracts.  In its broadest sense Interest-Based Bargaining 
(IBB) rejects adversarial negotiations and proposes instead that participants approach negotiation 
as partners, first identifying problems or issues and then working together to reach mutually 
satisfactory solutions.  Sound too pie-in-the-sky?  Let me illustrate with a couple of examples 
from my experience at Cleveland State University. 
In 1998, Cleveland State University went through the complex process of converting 
from the quarter system academic calendar to the semester calendar.  Naturally, there were a 
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number of issues surrounding calendar conversion that impinged upon the University’s faculty 
contract with the Cleveland State chapter of the American Association of University Professors.  
Most of these issues were quite perfunctory: little more than adapting the prescribed timetable 
for such things as the promotion/tenure process, the sabbatical leave process, and the 
grievance/arbitration process from quarters to semesters.  But one issue loomed large: faculty 
workload, especially the teaching workload.  There was a lingering suspicion among some 
faculty at CSU that the administration intended to use calendar conversion as a subterfuge for 
increasing faculty teaching loads, even though both faculty and administration had already 
agreed that two of the principal goals of the conversion were that students would be held 
harmless and the impact on faculty workloads would be neutral. 
On the basis of these general understandings, the president of CSU-AAUP came to me to 
suggest that these circumstances provided an opportunity s to resolve the issue through Interest-
Based Bargaining. It was an offer the administration could hardly refuse, although I must admit, 
IBB was little more than a vague concept to me at the time.  What exactly is IBB? 
 As labor-management practice, IBB is relatively new, tracing its origin to an academic 
study published by Richard Walton (A Behavioral Theory of Labor Relations, 1965).  Much 
better known is the practical guide to IBB by Roger Fisher and William Ury (Getting to Yes:  
Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, 1981).  But from the mid-1960s through the 1980s, 
IBB existed as little more than an academic theory of labor-management relations.  It was only in 
the late 1980s that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) began training and 
facilitating Interest-Based Bargaining.  Here are two short observations about IBB that I think 
are particularly useful:  
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Successful interest-based bargaining . . . requires union and management 
participants to master new skills and techniques.  If they fail to do so, they are 
likely to fall back on the skills and techniques they are familiar with from 
adversarial bargaining, most of which are incompatible with IBB.  (Barrett and 
O’Dowd, 2005, p.90) 
 
Successful collaborative negotiation lies in finding out what the other side really 
wants and showing them a way to get it, while you get what you want.  (Cohen, 
1980, p. 161) 
 
And so we began the IBB process.  Everything about it was different.  No attorneys were 
present for either side.  A facilitator from the FMCS took both teams together through a 2-3 day 
training process designed to build trust and to familiarize us with procedures many faculty and 
faculty-administrators are impatient and cynical about: brainstorming, flip-charting, etc.  Other 
unfamiliar territory was explored during the training process: 
• No expressions of contempt, eye-rolling, or other value judgments are 
allowed during brainstorming.  The idea is to get as many options on the 
table as possible.  Non-viable options can be eliminated later. 
 
• No caucuses.  If one team feels it’s really necessary to take a brief caucus, 
then it is obliged to explain the purpose of the caucus to the members of 
the other team. 
 
• All meals were to be taken together as a further team-building technique 
(no lunch caucuses).  
 
• No negotiating table.  Team members sit interspersed in a circle or at a 
round table and sit next to different people each day. 
 
• No lead negotiators.  All team members are encouraged to participate 
equally. 
 
• No positions are presented by either side.  Problems are identified; 
subjected to the brainstorming and flip-charting techniques; options are 
explored and eliminated; and when consensus on a particular issue has 
been achieved, a combined writing team is appointed to draft proposed 
contract language, which is then brought back to the entire group for 
further discussion and refinement.  When all are satisfied, the language 
becomes a tentative agreement, and you move on to the next issue. 
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• The litmus test for successful IBB is three-fold.  Is the solution arrived at 
feasible?  Is it desirable?  Is it acceptable to the executive 
committees/bargaining councils of both sides? 
 
 
In any case, the issues involved in conversion from quarters to semesters, including the matter of 
faculty workload, were put to the IBB process.  Although the process was very time-consuming 
(a matter I’ll come back to in a moment), agreement was reached with a minimum of insults, 
teeth-gnashing, and backbiting. 
So . . . how did we handle the teaching load issue?  Under the old quarter system, the 
“normal” teaching load for faculty productive in research and service was two 4-credit courses 
per term.  Under semesters, most courses are 3-credit courses.  It became apparent that many 
faculty were daunted at the prospect of having, under semesters, to teach three 3-credit courses 
during at least one of the semesters; the extra course preparation was viewed as an increased 
workload.  Gradually, our discussions shifted from number of courses per semester to number of 
credit hours per semester.  And eventually, through brainstorming, flip-charting, multiple drafts 
of potential contract language, and several pointed reminders from our FMCS facilitator about 
the concept of partnership, we arrived at a formula involving a combination of 4-credit and 3-
credit courses that proved reasonably satisfactory to everybody.  Faculty were pleased that they 
could preserve a two-course-per-term teaching load.  The administration was pleased that faculty 
credit-hour (revenue-generating) production remained equivalent in the new semester system.  
The agreed-upon workload formula takes up about four closely-printed pages in the faculty 
collective bargaining agreement, but the language met the IBB criteria: feasible, desirable, 
acceptable (CSU Agreement, 2003-2006, pp. 32-36). 
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Were there any downsides?  From my perspective, although the bargaining proved to be 
collegial and collaborative, it took an incredible amount of time to reach tentative agreements on 
the few issues connected to semester conversion.  Including the 2-3 day training period, the two 
teams were at it for nearly a month.  This very slow pace is quite typical and is one of the 
standard criticisms of the IBB process (Roche, 2002.  Barrett and O’Dowd, 2005, p. 26). 
You can imagine my chagrin, therefore, at contract negotiating time when our outside 
attorney (who was expected to be the University’s chief negotiator in a traditional bargaining 
process) suggested that the administration propose to the union that the entire contract be 
negotiated using the IBB process.  After all, he said, you’ve got experience, and you know it 
works.  I was very reluctant.  If it took a month to deal with one issue, how long would it take to 
deal with an entire contract?  I girded my loins for a year or more.  But we made the proposal; 
the AAUP accepted; and we set to work with an FMCS facilitator.  To my absolute amazement 
and delight, we evolved a kind of modified IBB process that shortcut some of the lengthiest 
procedures and completed the bargaining process in two and a half months.  Incredible!  Our 
history showed that it usually took 6-9 months to bargain a contract using traditional adversarial 
negotiation.  Yet, using IBB, we were finished in considerably less than half that amount of time 
including the development of some nifty innovations with regard to such things a merit salary 
increases, professional development funding, and the like. 
How ironic that, last fall at contract renegotiation time, when the administration proposed 
that we again employ the IBB process that had worked so expeditiously in 2003, the union flatly 
rejected it in favor of returning to the traditional adversarial process.  Bargaining began in 
October 2006.  Five months later, impasse was reached on several key issues; mediation failed to 
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produce an agreement; fact-finding ensued; and I learned that just last week, tentative agreement 
had been reached on all issues, although the proposed contract has yet to be ratified by union 
members and the University Board of Trustees. 
What does the Cleveland State University case history tell us about the possibilities for 
Interest-Based Bargaining in higher education?  For one thing, the CSU situation clearly 
illustrates the principal risks of IBB for both the union and the administration.  For management, 
IBB can prove to be a very slow and tedious process.   Therefore, change also can occur only on 
an extended timetable.  Also problematic for management is the substantial investment of 
administrators’ time in seemingly endless training exercises, meetings, and bargaining sessions.  
The risks of IBB for faculty unions, however, may be even greater.  The process of partnering 
with the administration may create the impression among the union rank-and-file that their 
leaders have been co-opted by the administration. (Barrett and O’Dowd, 2005, p. 20.  My 
communications with colleagues at Florida Gulf Coast University and Florida State University, 
who also have experience with Interest-Based Bargaining, indicate that they also experienced 
similar kinds of risks and challenges.)  It’s clear to me that this latter concern was at work at 
Cleveland State; the AAUP Executive Committee’s decision to reject IBB in the recent contract 
negotiations was taken in order to reconnect with its base constituency and to dramatize the 
continued need for a faculty union willing to confront the administration. 
On a much more positive note, the Cleveland State experience with IBB shows that it is 
possible to forge partnerships with a faculty union and to create mutually beneficial solutions to 
problems, even difficult and potentially divisive issues like workloads, merit salary increases, 
and professional development funding.  As Dr. Hudson Rogers, Associate Provost and Associate 
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Vice President for Academic Affairs at Florida Gulf Coast University, observed in a recent email 
message to me.  “From the [FGCU] management team’s perspective, we find the process a bit 
slow, but overall it has been very informative as it brings to the discussion ideas and options that 
otherwise would not have surfaced.  As such, it provides greater insight into the motivation 
behind some [union] requests.”   
I think we can conclude that Interest-Based Bargaining is not likely to be successful in an 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust between negotiators or where senior administrators 
and union leaders can offer only tepid support for the process.  In those circumstances, 
substantial time will need to be devoted to building relationships. (Barrett and O’Dowd, 2005, 
pp. 12-18).   However, IBB can be confidently recommended where the bargaining agenda 
harbors opportunities for “win-win” solutions and where the relationships between faculty and 
administration are strong enough to sustain such an approach to collective bargaining. 
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